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SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 
 
 
ERIE’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
Craig Green* 
I am very honored and grateful to be included in this symposium, 
which encompassed two days at the vibrant University of Akron School 
of Law, with a corresponding privilege to meet and renew connections 
with other participants in the event. Only a few cases in American law 
have their own birthday celebrations. Over the years, there have been 
temporally benchmarked events to commemorate Marbury, Brown, 
Miranda, Roe, Chevron, and a few other iconic decisions.1 This 
symposium for Erie’s 80th anniversary is similarly distinctive, and I 
would like to start by briefly considering what qualifies judicial rulings 
 
* James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University; Ph.D., Princeton University; J.D., Yale 
Law School. 
 1.  See generally, Symposium, Erie Railroad at Seventy-Five, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2013); 
Symposium, Law Without a Lawmaker, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2013) (including several 
analyses of Erie on the decision’s 75th anniversary); The Golden Anniversary Year: Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 1988 AALS Proceedings 1, 130 (1988); See, e.g., Symposium, 
Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003); Symposium, Judging 
Judicial Review: Marbury in the Modern Era, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2557 (2003); Gary Orfield & 
Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (2004); 
Symposium, Revisiting Brown v. Board. of Education: 50 Years of Legal and Social Debate, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); Roe at 40: The Controversy Continues, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 
(2014); Symposium, 50 Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 
28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 513 (1995); Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, 
Privacy Laws Today, 47 CONN. L. REV. 971 (2015); Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 97 B.U.L. REV. 681 (2017); Symposium, 20 Years After: The Impact of the Chevron Decision 
Upon the Development of Federal Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005); see also, Jack 
B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie 
Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1988); James 
A. Gorrell & Ithamar D. Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276, 308 (1948); 
Joseph L. Lenihan, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins–After 50 Years, 53 KY. BENCH & B. 22 (1989); Richard 
D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1988); Linda C. McClain, Prejudice, Moral 
Progress, and Being ‘On the Right Side of History’: Reflections on Loving v. Virginia at 50, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2701 (2018). 
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for memorialization in doctrinal history. Year after year, the continuous 
stream of new cases never runs dry, yet some rulings hold persistent spots 
in the legal pantheon, with corresponding recognition on some grand 
historical calendar. 
It may not be possible to fully explain why particular iconic cases 
tower over the rest, but a few general characteristics are worth mentioning. 
For instance, legal communities that commemorate a judicial decision 
almost certainly believe that it accomplished something singular and 
distinctive. An iconic case cannot simply represent a long line of 
precedent—a smooth arc of case law would not produce a specific 
moment to celebrate. On the contrary, there must be a dramatic break with 
a pre-decisional past, or some extraordinary application of existing 
doctrine to unconsidered facts. 
Likewise, cases with anniversary celebrations must represent 
something larger than themselves. That is why iconic decisions often 
include grand or indeterminate language, which allows future generations 
to interpret and reinterpret doctrinal meanings under variable 
circumstances. Debates over iconic cases, insofar as they remain iconic, 
are never fully resolved, and that is partly the point. Interpretations tend 
to develop and cycle, raising new questions and answers, even as they 
shift and readjust to meet new interpretive priorities.2 Erie satisfies all of 
those criteria, and insofar as this essay only has a few pages to analyze 80 
years, I’d better hurry. 
The most important thing to understand about Erie is that the iconic 
decision today is not what it used to be, and in the future, the case might 
not remain what it is right now.3 This essay proceeds in three 
chronologically sequenced steps that sketch how Erie became what it is, 
consider what it might become, and offer some explanation for why 
modern readers should care. Changes in political context, judicial 
personnel, economic consequences, and even academic commentary have 
all combined to determine Erie’s doctrinal meaning over time. And in 
turn, that process will continue onward for as long as any legal community 
cares enough to notice. Happy birthday Erie! 
 
 2.  Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents, 94 
N.C. L. REV. 379, 383–84; 440 (2016). 
 3.  For similarly historicized accounts of Erie, see id.; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS 
AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2nd ed. 2000); TONY FREYER, HARMONY & 
DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); Daniel R. Ernst, Thinking 
Like a Historian: Erie in the Dimension of Time, 26 L. & SOC. INQ. 719 (2001) (book review). 
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The first step is to consider “original Erie” as it was decided in 1938. 
This symposium was convened to celebrate one of the most radical 
decisions in American law, though it might be hard for readers to 
recognize it as such. On this 80th anniversary, Erie looks old, respectable, 
and almost boring.4 Political struggles over corporate power and federal 
courts were crucial to Erie in 1938, when railroads, insurance companies, 
and corporate interests regularly schemed their way into federal 
jurisdiction to receive favorable substantive law.5 Once upon a time, those 
conflicts dominated legal analysis of diversity jurisdiction, but now such 
issues have largely dissipated and relocated to other legal fields.6 
Modern law students know that studying Erie is one of law school’s 
universal rites of passage. But they seldom understand why people from 
past eras cared so much about the decision. The venerable octogenarian 
Erie was born a hell raiser, and one premise of this essay is that no lawyer 
should ever forget it. 
In 1938, the Court annihilated almost 100 years of precedent with a 
pen stroke, declaring “[t]here is no federal general common law” even 
though no lawyer ever made that argument, and even though federal 
judges across the country had previously applied federal general common 
law as a matter of routine.7 No lawyer or commentator predicted Erie’s 
 
 4.  For a strong call for modern observers to recognize Erie’s outrageousness, see Suzanna 
Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPPERDINE 
L. REV. 129, 130; 149–52 (2012). 
 5.  EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992). 
 6.  But see, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (providing federal jurisdiction for certain multiparty, multiforum 
tort litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (codifying the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
 7.  Compare Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) with, e.g., Willing v. 
Binenstock, 302 U.S. 272, 275 (1937) (“We have no occasion to consider whether [the Rules of 
Decision Act] is applicable. Under Swift v. Tyson, it would not be.”) (unanimous opinion); Boseman 
v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 203–04 (1937) (unanimous opinion) (“We are unable to 
agree with decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in cases similar to this that the certificate 
is a part of the contract of insurance or that its delivery is necessary to make the policy effective. Nor 
are we required to follow their construction.”) (quoting Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)) (footnote 
omitted)); Christian v. Waialua Agr. Co., 93 F.2d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1937) (“If the questions of law 
before us are questions of general law, then we may exercise our own independent judgment in the 
decision thereof.”); Glover v. State Bank of Birds, 95 2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1938) (applying general 
commercial law in reliance on Swift v. Tyson); Nat’l Exch. Bank & Trust Co. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
19 F. Supp. 790, 791 (W.D. Pa. 1937) (“The interpretation of a life insurance policy is a question of 
general commercial law.”); General Petroleum Corp. v. Seaboard Terminals Corp., 19 F. Supp. 882, 
885 (D. Md. 1937) (discussing the applicability of Swift v. Tyson to judicial interpretations of state 
statutes); Mattison-Geenlee Service Corp. v. Culhane, 20 F. Supp. 882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1937) (“While 
it may be true, as some have thought, that the rule of Swift v. Tyson, supra, will receive substantial 
restriction of application to the future, there is nothing in Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty Co., 290 U.S. 
47, and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335, to suggest its nonapplication to the problems 
of general commercial law.”). 
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result, much less did anyone request or imagine the Court’s constitutional 
rationale.8 Indeed, commentators at the time found the Court’s unexpected 
and tangled explanation about the “unconstitutionality” of Swift v. Tyson 
even harder to understand than it seems today.9 
Some modern observers cite Erie an example of judicial humility,10 
but the opposite is also true. Erie represented the kind of judicial hubris 
that would later be called judicial activism, relying on constitutional 
arguments that were never litigated and that the legal mainstream could 
not comprehend.11 Erie is sometimes celebrated because the application 
of state law in federal courts can expose federal adjudicators to new ideas, 
which migrate and cross-pollinate other kinds of decisions.12 But 
important multicentric dialogues about common-law doctrines were 
transformed if not squelched by Erie’s decision to eliminate federal 
general common law. Federal courts before Erie had never threatened the 
independence of state courts to decide their own cases using their own 
best judgment—federal and state cases coexisted, regardless of their 
harmony or dissonance.13 By contrast, after Erie, federal courts simply 
aimed to mimic state supreme courts, without performing the kind of 
experimental dynamism that some modernists now seem to value. 
Whereas some analysts today characterize Erie as a gradual outgrowth of 
changing jurisprudential ideology, the decision in its day was the kind of 
violent, sudden rupture that seldom happens in American law.14 
Federal courts had been collateral participants in significant swaths 
of common-law decision making, including commercial law, contracts, 
and some tort cases as well.15 Erie substantially reduced that role, leading 
some federal judges to believe in diversity cases that they were reduced 
to ventriloquists’ dummies that could only parrot state court decisions 
 
 8.  See Green, supra note 2, at 430–32 (collecting lawyers’ briefs and other contemporaneous 
sources). 
 9.  Compare Commentary, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1938), with Craig Green, 
Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008). 
 10.  See e.g., Ernest A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 175 (2019).  
 11.  Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1200 
(2009). 
 12.  See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, An Erie Approach to Privilege Doctrine, 10 CONLAWNOW 
205 (2019); Laura E. Little, Erie’s Unintended Consequence: Federal Courts Creating State Law, 52 
AKRON L. REV. 273 (2019); Ernest A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 175 (2019).  
 13.  See Green, supra note 2, at 409–11 (discussing New York state courts’ explicit refusal to 
follow the United States Supreme Court’s result in Swift v. Tyson itself). 
 14.  See, e.g., Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie Case, 30 
KY. L.J. 3, 3 (1941). 
 15.  Green, supra note 2, at 411–26 (discussing Swift’s expansion, and critics’ resistance 
thereto). 
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about state law.16 For better or worse, the Supreme Court explained its 
Erie decision with a scrambled hash of constitutional rhetoric, alongside 
dicta about statutory interpretation and judicial pragmatism.17 As an 
editorial sidenote, I might suggest that the pragmatic arguments which 
predated Erie were the most sensible, least controversial parts of the 
Court’s opinion.18 And modern courts’ reliance on the “twin aims of 
Erie”—forum shopping and inequitable legal administration—suggests 
that those same practical arguments might have provided an essential 
platform for much of the theorizing that emerged afterward.19 
This essay’s second step is to consider “mid-century Erie,” 
explaining how the radical Erie that most lawyers ignore became the 
boring Erie that most law students study. One direct explanation lies with 
the Legal Process School, which included Felix Frankfurter, Herbert 
Wechsler, and many other people during the 1950s and 1960s.20 In 
briefest summary, the Legal Process School was preoccupied with 
questions of legal purpose, function, and system.21 Its central 
constitutional issues involved questions of structure, especially including 
federalism and separation of powers.22 Legal Process represented a deep 
engagement with judicial craft and technique, with legal nooks and 
crannies such as abstention, passive virtues, and statutory interpretation—
addressing time and again what federal courts should do under 
circumstances of legislative vagueness, silence, or absurdity. 
Erie was an adopted hero of the Legal Process Movement. In their 
hands, the technical choice between state common law and federal general 
 
 16.  Richardson v. Comm’r, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.), quoted in Charles E. 
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE 
L.J. 267, 284 (1946). 
 17.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73–80 (1938). 
 18.  See, e.g., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 
(Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., 1931) (collecting pragmatic critiques). 
 19.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1865 (2013). 
 20.  PURCELL, supra note 3, at 222–84; William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (1994). 
 21.  Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996); John David Ohlendorf, 
Purposivism Outside Statutory Interpretation, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 235, 243–44 (2016); Ronald J. 
Krotosynzski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial 
Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 993, 999–1003 (1999). 
 22.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 953, 953 (1994); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 993, 993 (1994); Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the 
Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L.REV. 
1021, 1021 (1994). 
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common law implicated big concepts and arguments about purpose, 
function, and system. With respect to Erie, all of those issues arose in a 
context where explicit textual authority from the Constitution, the Rules 
of Decision Act, and the Supreme Court itself was vanishingly rare. 
Nothing could be more perfect for legal process argument and analysis. 
To be clear, elements of Legal Process predated Hart and Wechsler’s 
casebook in 1953 or Hart and Sacks’s teaching materials in 1948. As a 
political matter, Legal Process appealed to conservatives who wished to 
justify the status quo as a system that was intact and integrated.23 It also 
appealed to liberals who sought to use their own legal sensibilities to make 
law work incrementally better.24 But the main characteristics of Legal 
Process were its ostensible centrism, apolitical stability, process-based 
legitimacy, and institutional settlement. Erie was rewritten to fit the Legal 
Process mode, embodying a flexible allocation of responsibility between 
state and federal law, state and federal courts, and also between federal 
courts and Congress.25 Most of all, Legal Process Erie was recharacterized 
as something apolitical and rational, even though in 1938 the decision was 
nothing like that. 
The Legal Process version of Erie would outlast the Legal Process 
Movement itself as a dominant feature of American law. From the left, 
Legal Process scholarship was generally attacked by versions of civil 
rights and feminism that ultimately produced various forms of critical 
legal theory.26 On the right, Legal Process was pressured by legal 
formalism—including textualism and originalism—that endorsed public 
choice political theory while demanding greater specificity between legal 
authority and identifiable text.27 From both political wings of American 
legal culture, the 1970s and 1980s marked a period of disavowal, despair, 
and diminution with respect to the existence of objective purposes, 
entities, and systems that could exist outside of ordinary politics. The left 
complained that Legal Process rhetoric masked the power of rich white 
men, while the right criticized elite judges and cultural progressives for 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 175 (2019). 
 24.  Stephen Breyer, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985). 
 25.  PURCELL, supra note 3, at 222–84 
 26.  See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Amici Curiae, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 819 (1989) (book review); 
Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 601, 601 (1993); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential 
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 288 (1973); Resnik, supra note 22. 
 27.  See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 n. 99 
(2006); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 12–42 (2007). 
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imposing their political will instead of the law “as it is.” Lawyers on the 
left and the right also departed from the Legal Process Movement because 
both sides wanted radical reform, whether in support of self-consciously 
new liberties and equalities or as a return to the 18th century history of 
founders’ virtue. 
By contrast, the Legal Process version of Erie stumbled on, still 
making good practical sense and evermore entrenched in operative 
judicial doctrine. The decision still lacked a satisfactory constitutional 
rationale, if anyone cared much about that. But so long as Erie stayed in 
its lane—concerning the allocation of federal and state lawmaking in 
contexts like diversity and supplemental jurisdiction—most observers did 
not worry about legal origins. Regardless of whether the decision was 
based on constitutional law, legal positivism, the Rules of Decision Act, 
or anything else, there has been and there remains little enthusiasm for 
overturning Erie’s result and resurrecting federal general common law 
that prevailed under Swift v. Tyson. 
The third step of this essay is to consider Erie’s meaning today and 
tomorrow. This symposium’s thoughtful contributions cover an 
immensely wide range, analyzing Erie’s potential application to evidence, 
intellectual property, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and many 
other contexts.28 As part of that process, however, it might be worth 
asking whether such diverse arguments intend to rely on Erie at the time 
it was written, Erie from the middle 20th century, Erie today, or perhaps 
no Erie at all. Especially insofar as judicial pragmatism and intersystemic 
comity are treated as subconstitutional legal values—which earn their 
meaning without attachment to 18th century history, and which are 
necessarily subject to amendment or repeal by Congress—many of this 
symposium’s proposals about evidentiary privileges, the federal circuit, 
the Rules Advisory Committee, and other legal fields seem identically 
persuasive with or without a doctrinal reference to Erie. 
Some readers might object that including Erie to otherwise 
freestanding policy proposals as a doctrinal ornament does not matter 
much. But indeed, Erie’s presence might matter, if precedents matter and 
if constitutional law matters. Speaking autobiographically, I first 
participated in 21st century Erie debates to counter suggestions that Erie 
constitutionally eviscerated customary international law under the Alien 
Tort Statute.29 I remained in those debates to counter suggestions that Erie 
 
 28.  Symposium, Erie at Eighty: Choice of Law Across the Disciplines, 52 AKRON L. REV. 175 
(2019). 
 29.  Green, supra note 9. 
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constitutionally eviscerated large categories of federal administrative 
law.30 And of course, administrative law’s constitutional status in the 
United States has been more vigorous in recent years than at any point 
since 1937.31 Every time that Erie’s famous name is applied to some new 
context, without detailed attention to what the decision means and has 
meant, it only amplifies the decision’s doctrinal flexibility. Other potential 
targets for expansive interpretations of Erie, especially ones that include 
references to constitutional separation of powers, include Bivens 
remedies, and perhaps litigation under Section 1983, along with other ill-
defined examples of federal common law—not federal general common 
law—including other statutes that authorize judicial lawmaking by 
implication. 
What does the future hold? With Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation, 
there is no way to know. The current Supreme Court is more conservative 
than any group of justices since 1937, and other federal courts will only 
shift farther rightward over time. One thing I do know is that those who 
cannot remember the past are doomed to lose debates about it. And even 
as lawyers gather to celebrate Erie’s triumph 80 years ago in support of 
Brandeis’s progressive politics, some of us might be wary about a newly 
politicized Erie in the hands of a new generation of legal conservatives. 
 
 
 30.  Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 661 
(2008). 
 31.  Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Constitutional Debates over 
Chevron and Political Transformation in American Law (Temple University Legal Studies Research 
Working Paper No. 2018- 35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264482 
[https://perma.cc/JZG9-9NTF]. 
